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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Crim PRocimuEE-FUNG Fms-Immqic.s: WASmNGTON COURTS
HAvE NnmuwT Powim To WAIVE FILING FEEs FOR INDiGms IN
Crvm AcnoNs.-O'Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wash. Dec. 2d 759, 458
P.2d 154 (1969).
Mrs. Glennie O'Connor's sole source of support for herself and five
children was a $325 monthly grant from the Washington State Depart-
ment of Public Assistance. Through her attorney she tendered a com-
plaint for replevin and damages1 in the amount of $215.50 to the judge
and clerk of the Yakima Justice Court, and filed a motion and affidavit
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.2 The judge and his clerk re-
fused to accept the complaint and issue notice of suit to the named
defendants on the grounds that she had not paid the statutorily pre-
scribed court fees of $3.50 Mrs. O'Connor then began an original
proceeding in the Washington Supreme Court to obtain a writ of
mandamus ordering the respondents to accept and file her complaint
without payment of any fees. Her petition for a writ of mandamus was
tendered to the clerk of the supreme court without the filing fees re-
1. Mrs. O'Connor claimed that a former landlord had wrongfully taken and disposed
of some of her furniture and other personal property.
2. The term "in forma pauperis" as used in this note refers to the procedure of
allowing a poor person to sue or bring an action without being required to pay a court
fee.
3. WAwr. REv. CODE § 3.16.070 (1961):
Fees of nonsalaried justices. The fees and compensation of justices of the peace
shall be as follows, to wit:
When each case is filed the sum of two dollars shall be paid by the plaintiff,
which said sum shall include the docketing of the cause, the issuing of notice and
summons, the trial of the case and the entering of the judgment.
WASH. REV. CODE § 27.24.070 (1969):
Additional filing fees. In each county pursuant to this chapter, the clerk of the
superior court shall pay from each fee collected for the filing in his office of every
new probate or civil matter, including appeals, abstracts or transcripts of judgments,
the sum of three dollars for the support of the law library in that county, which
shall be paid to the county treasurer to be credited to the county law library fund.
There shall be paid to each justice of the peace in every civil action commenced
in such court where the demand or value of the property in controversy is one
hundred dollars or more, in addition to the other fees required by law the sum of
one dollar and fifty cents as fees for the support of the law library in that county
which are to be taxed as part of costs in each case:
(1) By each person instituting an action, when the first paper is filed;
(2) By each defendant, other adverse party, or intervenor, appearing separately
when his appearance is entered on his first paper filed.
The justice of the peace shall pay such fees so collected to [the] county treasurer
to be credited to the county law library fund.
Although $3.50 seems to be a small amount, to one who is strictly budgeted on a wel-
fare grant, it is money not available. See text accompanying notes 19-21 infra.
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quired by Supreme Court Rule on Appeal 101 along with her request
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The court granted Mrs. O'Con-
nor's petition to proceed in forma pauperis in the supreme court, and
issued mandamus directing the Justice of the Peace to exercise his
discretionary powers to determine whether justice court fees should be
waived. Held: All Washington state courts have the inherent power
to waive both statutorily prescribed court fees and court rules pertain-
ing to fees where a civil action is brought by an indigent in good faith
and presents an issue of probable substance. O'Connor v. Matzdorff,
76 Wash. Dec. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 154 (1969).
Prior to this decision, the federal government and a number of states
had enacted statutes empowering their courts to waive court fees for
4. WASH. SuP. CT. R.O.A. 10:
The clerk shall not file any paper on the part of any party to a proceeding until
the statutory docket fees, chargeable against such party have been paid . . .
Since the rendering of the O'Connor opinion, the Washington Supreme Court has
amended this rule's successor (WAsH. SuP. CT. R.O.A. 1-10) to read in part as follows:
(a) Requirement. The clerk shall not file any paper on the part of a party to a
proceeding until the statutory docket fee, chargeable against such party, has been
paid or the party has been authorized to proceed without the payment of fee.
(1) Waiver in Civil Cases.
(iii) Indigent Cases. Upon a petition to proceed without the payment of a docket
fee supported by an affidavit showing to the satisfaction of the Chief Justice peti-
tioner does not have the means to pay the docket fee and that the appeal is in
good faith and not frivolous, the Chief Justice may waive the requirement of a
docket fee.
WASH. CT. APP. R.O.A. 10 has been similarly amended. Both Rules are reported in 77
Wash. Dec. 2d at 518-20 (1970). WAsH. REv. CODE § 2.32.070 (1956):
The clerk of the supreme court shall collect the following fees for his official
services:
Upon filing his first paper or record and making an appearance in the supreme
court, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of said court a docket fee of five dollars.
Upon making his appearance in the supreme court, the respondent in any ap-
pealed case shall pay to the clerk a fee of two dollars.
The applicant or petitioner in any special proceeding in the supreme court, upon
making his appearance, shall pay to the clerk thereof a fee of three dollars.
The respondent in a special proceeding, and each respondent appearing separately
therein, at the time of his appearance shall pay to the clerk a fee of one dollar.
For copies of opinions of the supreme court, ten cents per folio.
For certificates showing admission of an attorney to practice law one dollar, except
that there shall be no fee for an original certificate to be issued at the time of his
admission.
The foregoing fees shall be all the fees connected with the appeal or special
proceeding.
No fees shall be required to be advanced by the state or any municipal corpo-
ration, or any public officer prosecuting or defending on behalf of such state or
municipal corporation.
For all services for which no fee is herein prescribed, the clerk of the supreme
court shall receive the same fees as are prescribed for clerks of the superior courts
for like services.
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the poor in civil actions,5 but American courts have been somewhat
reluctant to recognize an inherent power to do soY In Martin v. Su-
perior Court,7 however, the California court reasoned that the early
common law of England embraced the privilege of proceeding in forma
pauperis, and that, since the California State Constitution incorporated
the common law into the laws of California, the privilege existed in
that state.8 The Supreme Court of Texas also found that the Texas
courts had an inherent power to waive court fees, but its statement
was only dictum since a statute authorizing waiver had already been
enacted.'
The O'Connor court concluded that, with regard to Supreme Court
Rule on Appeal 1010 which requires the clerk of the supreme court to
collect statutorily prescribed court fees, there exists within the court
an inherent power to waive the requirements of its own rules. The
court reasoned that the power to make rules carries with it an implied
power to waive them or to make an exception where justice so re-
quires.'1
Apparently, unconcerned by the lack of authority in other states,
the Washington court also found that the power to waive fees pre-
scribed by statute existed inherently in the courts at common law. The
court's reasoning is not clearly stated in the opinion," - but may be
deduced from a reading of the authorities cited.
5. See Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 Gao. LJ. 516,
523 (1968) which notes that thirty-two states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
government have either statutes or court rules which enable the courts to waive fees.
The federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964), provides for in forma pauperis proceedings
in federal courts for both civil and criminal actions. Indigence and good faith are pre-
requisites, and courts may dismiss actions that are frivolous or malicious. The state
statutes afford a general privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis, but all circumscribe
the privilege with various qualifications. See text accompanying notes 54-59 infra.
6. See Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Per-
sons in Civil Cases, 2 VAL'A~isso U.L. REv. 21, 30-31 (1967).
7. 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917).
8. The court noted that an early English statute provided for the privilege, and thus
was part of the common law adopted by California. Nevertheless, said the court, the
privilege pre-dated this statute and
.. was in fact exercised as one of the inherent powers of the courts themselves,
quite independently of any statute.
168 P. 135, 137 (1917).
9. Hickey v. Rhine, 16 Tex. 576 (1856).
10. WAsi. Sup. CT. R.O.A. 10, supra note 4 (now as amended WAsr. Siup. CT. R.O.A.
I-10, supra note 4).
11. 76 Wash. Dec. 2d 759, 766, 458 P.2d 154, 158 (1969).
12. Id. at 769, 458 P.2d at 159. The court comes to this conclusion after a lengthy
two page citation from Annot., 6 A.L.R. 1281 (1920), but gives little indication of the
reasoning process used to reach this result.
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The procedure of waiving fees for the poor existed at a very early
period, as is evidenced in the statute 11 Hen. VII, c. 12 (1495), but
the case of Brunt v. Wardle13 indicates that this procedure existed even
prior to the enactment of the statute :14
But, after all, is St. I1 Henry VII, chap. 12, anything more than
confirmatory of the common law? In the learned report of the
Serjeants' case by my Brother Manning ... a case is referred to
that occurred twenty years before the passing of that act, from
which it appears that at common law if a party would swear that
he could not pay for entering his pleadings, the officer was bound
to enter them gratis ....
The Washington court apparently concluded that, since the first statute
authorizing a systematic fee structure was enacted in 1278,15 and the
procedure for waiving fees was not codified until 1495, a judicially-
created power to waive statutorily prescribed fees must have existed at
common law.
The Washington court found no clearly-expressed legislative intent
to pre-empt this inherent power, 16 despite the fact that a statute
specifically provides for an in forma pauperis privilege for an indigent
criminal defendant on appeal" but not for appeals in a civil suit.
Therefore, the court reasoned that in the absence of any indication of
a contrary legislative intent, the judiciary must have retained its com-
mon law power to waive statutorily prescribed court fees.
However, the court imposed standards on the exercise of this inherent
power and left the day-to-day application of the rule largely to the
discretion of the trial judges.
The standards are vague ones. The first requirement is that a person
be indigent. Indigence, as defined by the O'Connor court, is'8
a state of impoverishment or lack of resources . . . which,
when realistically viewed in the light of everyday practicalities
substantially and effectively impairs or prevents his pursuit of his
remedy. (Citation omitted.)
13. 133 ENG. REP. 1254 (C.P. 1841).
14. Id. at 1257.
15. Statute of Glouster, 6 EDW. 1, c. 1, (1274). See also Maguire, Poverty and Civil
Litigation, 36 HAizv. L. REv. 361, 366 (1923).
16. 76 Wash. Dec.2d at 766, 458 P.2d at 158.
17. WASH. REv. CODE § 2.32.080 (1956).
18. 76 Wash. Dec. 2d at 764, 458 P.2d at 156-57.
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A person on relief is presumed by the court to be indigent, 9 since wel-
fare payments are designed to provide only the basic necessities of life,
such as food, clothing, and shelter, and no amount is allocated for court
fees.20 Absolute destitution is not required; rather, the petitioner's
financial condition must be "viewed in light of everyday practical-
ities.'" 21 This would seem to suggest that if he were required to deprive
himself and his family of just one of the necessities of life in order to
pay the court fee, then he would be considered indigent.
Although this test of indigency appears to be fairly lenient, its fair-
ness in application could vary greatly among the individual judges who
require as much or as little proof as he feels is needed. Moreover, the
individual seeking to establish indigence has the burden of affirmatively
satisfying the judge's standard.
More serious objections may be raised to the other two conditions-
good faith22 and probable merit.23 Again, the indigent is subject to wide
discretion of the trial judge, which is virtually unhampered except for
an exceptionally vague rule. A suit which one judge views as being in
bad faith and without merit may be seen by another as in good faith
and meritorious, especially where there is no objective or definite
standard to be followed. And these conditions discriminate against the
poor, since one able to pay the court fees is not required to affirma-
tively show his good faith or the probable merit of his case.
By contrast, the federal statute20 4 and several of the state statutes
25
19. Id. at 763, 458 P.2d at 156.
20. See Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Per-
sons in Civil Cases, 2 VALPARAISO U.L. REv. 21, 40 n.100 (1967).
21. 76 Wash. Dec. 2d at 763-64, 458 P.2d at 157.
22. 76 Wash. Dec. 2d at 772, 458 P.2d at 162. The court does not state whether this
requirement is based on an objective or subjective standard, but probably intended it to
be subjective.
23. Id. at 722, 458 P.2d at 162.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964), authorizes federal courts to waive fees for a person who
makes an affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs .... Such affidavit shall state
the nature of the action, defense, or appeal and affiant's belief that he is entitled to
redress.
25. E.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 21.600(2) (1967):
If at any time it appears to the satisfaction of the court or the judge thereof, from
the affidavit of the party . . . that he cannot pay the trial fee ....
UTA3 CODE Amr. § 21-7-3 (1969):
Any person may institute, prosecute, defend, and appeal any cause in any court in
this state by taking and subscribing before any officer authorized to administer an
oath, the following: I -, do solemly swear (or affirm) that owing to my poverty
I am unable to bear the expenses of the action or legal proceedings which I am about
to commence, and that I verily believe I am justly entitled to the relief sought by
such action, legal proceedings or appeal.
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call only for an affidavit by an individual to establish his indigency.
Only if the affidavit is successfully challenged, will the case of the
indigent be dismissed.26 The federal statute also contains a provision
which gives the federal courts the power to dismiss frivolous cases.
This discretion is to be exercised with great restraint. The complaint
is to be dismissed only if one who had paid the fees could have ex-
pected the same treatment.28 Moreover, a recent decision of the Third
Circuit indicates that the lower courts must grant a hearing to consider
the probative value of the allegations of the complaint prior to such
dismissal.29 These procedures attempt to guarantee that an indigent
proceeding under the federal statute will receive the same consideration
from federal courts as is received by one who pays the fees.
In Washington there is unfortunately no such guarantee; indeed,
the court has created a separate set of especially ambiguous rules for
that group of citizens who cannot afford to litigate even the most
meritorious claim without a waiver of fees. The prime objective of the
court in further developing and defining adequate guidelines for the
trial courts should be to eliminate this double standard. Prima facie
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 59-2-1 (1966):
*. . a poor person, within the meaning of this section, shall be one who shall make
and file in the court, . . . , an affidavit stating that he is pecuniarily unable to pay
the fees ....
WASH. SuP. CT. R.O.A. 1-10 has just recently been amended to require in the case of
appeals only an affidavit showing indigency, good faith and probable merit to the satis-
faction of the Chief Judge-likewise WASH. CT. APP. R.O.A. 10. Both are reported in
77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 518-20 (1970). See note 4 supra.
26. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1964): "The court ... may dismiss the case if the
allegation of poverty is untrue ..."
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 59-2-1 (1966): "If any person shall swear falsely in such affidavit
.shall be guilty of false swearing and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as
provided by law for such offense."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 21-7-7 (1969): "If it is made to appear to the court by affidavit
that the affidavit or affirmation is untrue ... frivolous or malicious or without merit,
the court may . .. [require] such affiant to appear . . . to show cause, if any he has,
why his action or appeal should not be dismissed. Should the court be of the opinion
that the affidavit or affirmation is untrue ... the court . . . may dismiss it."
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1964): "The court . may dismiss the case . . . if satisfied
that the action is frivolous or malicious."
28. Reece v. Washington, 310 F.2d 139, 140 (9th Cir. 1962):
This authority is to be exercised with great restraint, and generally only where it
would be proper to dismiss the complaint sua sponte before service of process if it
were filed by one tendering the required fees.
29. Kelly v. Butler Bd. of Comm'r, 399 F.2d 133, 134 (3rd Cir. 1968):
Moreover, several recent decisions of this court ... require in cases like the instant
one, the lower court must grant a hearing so that the facts underlying the allegations
of the appellant's complaint may be fully developed and considered.
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proof of indigency should be satisfied by an affidavit signed by the
alleged indigent; only if the affidavit is adequately challenged, should
he be required to come forth with further evidence. The requirements
of good faith and probable merit should be eliminated as unnecessary,
for existing civil rules suffice to insure that harrassing or frivolous
litigation is prevented.30 These improvements would enable a poor per-
son to receive, as nearly as possible, the same consideration in Wash-
ington courts that is given to one with better financial resources.
Furthermore, it would minimize the possibility that a judge, while
purporting to act within his sound discretion, could unjustly deny an
indigent access to the courts.
It should be noted that the O'Connor court recognized only a con-
ditional privilege of access to the court for the poor; it did not deal
with federal constitutional questions which might have established
access to the courts free from financial barriers as a matter of right.31
The strongest argument under the Federal Constitution is that the
imposition of court fees is a denial of equal protection of the laws as
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 2 The Washington court,
however, implied that the instant case involved no issue of equal pro-
tection, distinguishing it on the ground that the cases cited by plaintiff
30. WAsHE. SuPER. CT. Civ. R. 56(c) provides that a motion for summary judgment
will be granted if it is shown ".. . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact .... "
Also WAsH. SuPER. CT. Civ. R. 12(c) provides for a judgment on the pleadings where
the proper motion is made. In additions, ABA CAxoNS op PRorxssioxAL ETcs No. 30
states:
The lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a defense when con-
vinced that it is intended merely to harass .... His appearance in court should be
deemed equivalent to an assertion on his honor that in his opinion his client's case
is one for proper judicial determination.
31. 76 Wash. Dec. 2d at 733, 458 P.2d at 162:
We need not consider at this time the constitutional arguments presented, inasmuch
as we are of the opinion that the court below has the power to waive court fees
and grant the petitioner the relief which she seeks.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
•.. Nor shall any state ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.
See Petitioner's Brief for Mandamus at 34-43, O'Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wash. Dec.
2d 759, 458 P.2d 154 (1969) which suggests two additional arguments: (1) that filing
fee statutes deprive indigents of their right to petition for a redress of grievances in
violation of the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, and
(2) that filing fee statutes deprive indigents of a hearing required by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
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were criminal in nature. It noted" that in these criminal cases a per-
son's liberty was at stake, unlike in the civil dispute at hand.84
While this is true, the fourteenth amendment makes no distinction
between criminal and civil laws, but embraces all laws. Further, a line
of recent cases involving the equal protection clause deals more with
court procedure-filing fees, transcripts, appeals, habeas corpus-than
with criminal procedure."s In fact, in one of these cases,36 despite
argument by the State of Iowa that the habeas corpus proceeding was
civil, the United States Supreme Court nevertheless applied the equal
protection clause. Thus, although the equal protection argument was
avoided in O'Connor by resort to the traditional judicial preference to
avoid constitutional issues whenever possible, the opinion would have
been more satisfactory if the equal protection argument had been
reached and the case had been considered and resolved along the
analytical lines suggested below.
A state has power to classify its citizens into various groupings for
a variety of purposes3 7 but the equal protection clause requires such
groupings or classifications to be reasonable and consistent with
legitimate state interests.38 A reasonable classification is one which
includes all persons similarly situated with respect to the purpose of
the law.39
At the outset, then, the classification created by the fee statutes must
be defined. These statutes do not expressly discriminate against in-
digents as a class by specifically excluding them from bringing civil
court actions; yet, Griffin v. Illinois," and the line of cases which fol-
33. 76 Wash. Dec. 2d at 773, 458 P.2d at 162.
34. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968, 972 (1968). In this case a statute
imposing as $45 filing fee in a divorce action was challenged on the basis that it was a
violation of the fourteenth amendment and the equal protection clause. Many of the
same arguments mentioned in the text were used in the district court, which refused to
accept them. The Supreme Court noted jurisdiction in 395 U.S. 974 (1969), and the case
is presently listed on the docket as number 265. It was argued on Dec. 8, 1969.
35. See notes 40 & 41 infra.
36. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 711 (1961).
37. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41, 43 (1915).
38. Id. at 41-42.
39. See, Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALrF. L. REv.
341, 346 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Tussman & tenBroek]; See also, F. S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920):
But the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legis-
lation so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.
40. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requirement of payment for transcript necessary for criminal
appeal violates equal protection).
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lowed it,41 demonstrate that the practical effect of requiring fees in
the judicial process is to exclude the poor as a class from the court-
house.42
It can be shown that a classification based on wealth has no rea-
sonable relationship to the legitimate purposes of the fee statutes.43
The two major objectives of these statutes seem to be (1) to discourage
frivolous suits, and (2) to provide revenue to support the operation of
the courts. As to the first objective, the statutes create a classification
which is in some respects under-inclusive and in other respects over-
inclusive. They are under-inclusive insofar as their purpose is to
eliminate frivolous suits,44 for 4
[t] here is no rational basis for assuming that an indigent's motion
for leave to appeal will be less meritorious than those of other
defendants. Indigents must have the same opportunity to invoke
the discretion of the [court].
Not all persons who bring frivolous suits are indigent; persons who
have finances adequate to pay the filing fee are just as likely to initiate
meritless actions. The statutes are also over-inclusive, for they un-
doubtedly prevent some poor persons from filing meritorious claims.
Where a law is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive, the United
States Supreme Court has been reluctant to allow it to stand.46
As for the second objective, the classification has no indispensable
relationship to the fiscal purpose of the statutes. The fees collected
41. In the following post-Griffin cases, statutes or court practices requiring various
payments by individuals to either the state or to other individuals were held to violate
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause: Burns v. Ohio 360 U.S. 252 (1959)
(payment of filing fee in order to appeal); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (pay-
ment of filing fee in order to pursue a writ of habeas corpus); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963) (denial of appointment of counsel for an indigent on appeal) ; Lane
v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (payment for transcript on a writ of error coramn nobis) ;
Long v. Dist. Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (payment for a transcript for appeal
after denial of a habeas corpus petition, in a habeas corpus proceeding).
42. That the practical effect of filing fees is to deny the poor access to the courts is
implicit in the following language from Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956):
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the poor the
right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies the poor
an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to pay the
costs in advance.
43. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966).
44. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 39, at 348.
45. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1959).
46. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966). See also Comment, Developments
in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. Rav. 1065, 1087 (1969).
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do not form a substantial portion of the total cost of operating the
judicial system, and their elimination in the case of indigents would
not have a substantial negative effect. Nor would the additional ex-
penditures caused by indigent suits be great when compared to the
social costs of denying poor persons access to the courts.4
A classification on the basis of wealth may possibly not be prohibited
per se, but if such a classification endangers a fundamental right, then
it is subject to close scrutiny and only a compelling state interest can
justify it.4 8 Access to the courts is a fundamental right,4" and fee re-
quirements deny this right to that class of citizens who are indigent.
Thus, it follows that this discrimination according to wealth is not
reasonably related to the objectives of the fee statutes, and there would
appear to be no compelling state interest which could justify such a
classification.
Finally, Washington's fee statutes may have presented the court
with an example of "invidious discrimination" against the poor in the
sense that term is used by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Griffin. His
view was that certain classifications are invalid per se regardless of
47. An official in the office of the Washington State Administrator for the Courts,
Olympia, Washington, informed the author that in Washington's most populous county
(King) all revenues, including fees, for the juvenile and superior courts equaled $518,-
270.00 in 1968, while expenditures amounted to $3,351,852.00. For the Seattle, Washing-
ton justice courts, the head clerk reported that revenues, including fees, were $87,391.00
for 1968 as against expenditures of $297,896.00. Fees thus constitute a relatively small per-
centage of operating expenses. The reduction in fee revenues by reason of waiver of
indigent fees would be slight, since it may be assumed that few poor persons are pres-
ently paying court fees (seeing as by definition to do so would require foregoing a
necessity of life). Some increase in expenditures may be anticipated due to filing of
indigent suits made possible by the fee waiver. However, even if these added costs were
regarded as substantial (which is unlikely), the state still may not pursue its fiscal goals
by means of invidious discrimination against poor persons. See note 51 and accompanying
text infra.
48. See Comment, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Ray.
1065, 1122 (1969).
49. Access to the courts can be viewed as "fundamental" in two possible ways. First,
it can be argued that a right of access to the courts is essential to ensure that justice is
equally available to all. Perhaps, just as in Griffin and the cases following it (see notes
40 & 41 supra), a right of access is not a constitutional right, but it is one which should
be recognized if our judicial system is to fulfill a meaningful role in our society.
Alternatively, it can be argued that a right to access is a constitutionally guaranteed
right to petition for redress of grievances under the first amendment. NAACP v. Button,
317 U.S. 415 (1963), established the right to petition the courts for redress of grievances,
at least where the liberties of assembly, speech and political expression are concerned. And
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967), seems to
recognize such a right. It is true that these cases lend themselves to other interpretations,
but the first amendment right to petition for redress of grievances is repeatedly men-
tioned in each of them.
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their reasonable relationship to legitimate state objectives, and an
invidious discrimination or classification offends equal protection re-
gardless of the consequences.50 According to Justice Harlan, the
Supreme Court has equally condemned laws which expressly dis-
criminate between rich and poor and laws of more general applicability
which in reality treat the poor more harshly than the rich. Supportive
of this view, the Court in Shapiro v. Thompson,5" a welfare case,
recognized that while a state has a valid interest in preserving the
fiscal integrity of its programs, it may not accomplish such a goal by
invidious distinctions between classes of citizens.
Although the Washington Supreme Court in O'Connor did not con-
sider these constitutional issues, and even though it placed unfair re-
strictions on the poor person's right of access to the courts, it must be
admitted in all fairness that the decision could have been even less
progressive. At least, the alternative which it chose is preferable to a
flat declaration that the issue is a legislative matter; 52 there was no
certainty that a statute authorizing an in forma pauperis proceeding in
civil cases would have been enacted in the near future, or even that
any group was lobbying for such an enactment. Moreover, the court
did not drasticaliy circumscribe the privilege of proceeding in forma
pauperis as has been done in other states. For example, the O'Connor
decision inferentially grants the privilege of proceeding without pay-
ment of fees at both the trial and the appellate levels,53 while various
statutes in other jurisdictions limit the privilege to the trial court
only.54 Moreover, the court did not, as has been done elsewhere, draw
a distinction between plaintiffs and defendants,55 put a specific mone-
50. 351 US. 12, 35 (1956).
51. 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
52. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968, 974 (1968).
53. This inference is based on the fact that Mrs. O'Connor was allowed to pursue
her case on appeal without having to pay the required supreme court filing fee. 76 Wash.
Dec. at 773, 458 P.2d at 162. In addition, the court states that the supreme court, the
superior courts, and the justice courts all possess the power to waive fees. Id. at 775,
458 P.2d at 163. Since announcing the decision in this case, the supreme court amended
the Rules on Appeal for both the supreme court and the appellate court to provide a
procedure for handling appeals where the appellant claims to be entitled to proceed with-
out payment of the filing fee. Note 4 supra.
54. E.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. AwN. § 33-1-3 (1963); MD. Axx. CODE art. 24 § 10(b)
(1966) ; VA. CODE Aux. § 14.1-183 (1964).
55. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 24 § 10(b) (1966); TENN. CODE A~x. § 20-1629 (Supp.
1968).
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tary limitation on the privilege,56 exclude certain types of actions such
as slander 57 or divorce, 8 or limit the scope of the privilege to citizens
of Washington State.59
The O'Connor court recognized the potential danger of injustice
posed by court fees, and, to alleviate the inequity of the fee system,
the court ruled that in certain circumstances Washington courts have
inherent power to waive such fees for indigents. Yet, the plight of the
indigent plaintiff or defendant is largely left to the mercy of the in-
dividual judge's discretion. The vagueness of the standards upon which
exercise of the power is conditioned exposes just claims of the poor to
many uncertainties. And, the burden of showing indigency, good faith,
and probable merit is placed only on parties who are poor.
The fundamental goal of the judicial process is the provision of a
forum for the just resolution of all legal disputes, whether they are
between the state and an individual or between two individuals. No
dispute can be justly resolved by the courts if their response to a re-
quest for adjudication differs according to the size of a party's pocket-
book. The courts must be able to say to all parties: "To no one will we
sell, to no one will we deny, ...right or justice."6 Thus, hopefully,
the O'Connor decision is only an intermediate step towards the eventual
recognition that a person, even in a civil suit, may not in any way be
denied access to the dispute settlement procedure of our society on
account of his financial situation.
56. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1629 (Supp. 1968); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 273A,§ 15A (1968); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-401 (1962).
57. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1629 (Supp. 1969).
58. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3413 (1959).
59. E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 1574 (1956); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.190 (1969).
60. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1956), quoting from Magna Carta.
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